Two New Decisions Allow Consumers to Unilaterally Revoke Written TCPA Consent But for Vastly Different Reasons

TCPAland already has one burning and endless controversy–the definition of ATDS–and now it looks like it has two.  Plus, TCPAland defendants just received more bad news out of the Northern District of Illinois–but that’s nothing new.

Just days after the Hon. Charlene Honeywell explained that TCPA consent in consumer contracts cannot be unilaterally revoked as a matter of “black letter law” in Medly v. Dish Network, Case No. 8:16-cv-2534-T-36TBM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144895 (M.D. Fl. Aug. 27, 2018), two different courts have issued new opinions coming out the opposite direction, but with stark differences in reasoning.

First, in Rodriguez v. Premier Bankcard, Case No. 3:16CV2541, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149225 (N.D. Oh. Aug. 31, 2018)–a case that is already notable for enforcing a subscribing husband’s consent in his wife’s lawsuit against his finance company— the Court meted out the consumer bar’s dream decision; ruling that the absence of a revocation provision in the pertinent consent agreement necessarily means that consent can be revoked by any reasonable means. This exact argument has been repeatedly rejected by other courts, however, since contractual provisions are never treated as subject to unilateral modification, making a testament of irrevocability completely unnecessary.  This is Contracts 101 folks.   

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